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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(1).
QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED TO UTAH SUPREME COURT
Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an action for the wrongful death of an
unborn child?
Standard of Review: On certification from federal district court, the Utah Supreme
Court's duty is to answer the legal question presented. The Court will not seek to resolve
the underlying dispute. Spackman v. Board of Educ. Of the Box Elder County Sch. Dist..
2000 UT 87.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§ 31A-22-627.

Coverage of emergency medical services

(1) A health insurance policy or health maintenance organization contract
may not:
(a) require any form of preauthorization for treatment of an
emergency medical condition until after the insured's condition has
been stabilized; or
(b) deny a claim for any covered evaluation, covered diagnostic test,
or other covered treatment considered medically necessary to
stabilize the emergency medical condition of an insured.
(2) A health insurance policy or health maintenance organization contract
may require authorization for the continued treatment of an emergency
medical condition after the insured's condition has been stabilized. If such
authorization is required, an insurer who does not accept or reject a request
for authorization may not deny a claim for any evaluation, diagnostic
1

testing, or other treatment considered medically necessary that occurred
between the time the request was received and the time the insurer rejected
the request for authorization.
(3) For purposes of this section:
(a) "emergency medical condition" means a medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, including
severe pain, such that a prudent layperson, who possesses an average
knowledge of medicine and health, would reasonably expect the
absence of immediate medical attention at a hospital emergency
department to result in:
(I) placing the insured's health, or with respect to a pregnant
woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child, in
serious jeopardy;
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions; or
(hi) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; and
(b) "hospital emergency department" means that area of a hospital in
which emergency services are provided on a 24-hour-a-day basis.
(4) Nothing in this section may be construed as:
(a) altering the level or type of benefits that are provided under the
terms of a contract or policy; or
(b) restricting a policy or contractfromproviding enhanced benefits
for certain emergency medical conditions that are identified in the
policy or contract.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-627(3)(a)(I)
§ 76-5-201.

Criminal homicide — Elements — Designations of offenses

(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise
specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another
human being, including an unborn child at any stage of its development.
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of
an unborn child caused by an abortion.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(1)
§ 76-7-301.1.

Preamble — Findings and policies of Legislature

(1) It is the finding and policy of the legislature, reflecting and reasserting
the provisions of Article I, Sections 1 and 7, Utah Constitution, which
recognize that life founded on inherent and inalienable rights is entitled to
protection of law and due process; and that unborn children have inherent
and inalienable rights that are entitled to protection by the state of Utah
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. §76-7-301.1
§ 75-7-303.

Representation by fiduciaries and parents

To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the representative and
the person represented or among those being represented with respect to a
particular question or dispute:
(1) a conservator may represent and bind the protected person whose estate
the conservator controls;
(2) a guardian may represent and bind the ward if a conservator of the
ward's estate has not been appointed;
(3) an agent having authority to act with respect to the particular question or
dispute may represent and bind the principal;
(4) a trustee may represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust;
(5) a personal representative of a decedent's estate may represent and bind
persons interested in the estate; and
(6) a parent may represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn child if a
conservator or guardian for the child has not been appointed.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6)
§ 78-11-6.

Injury or death of child -- Suit by parent or guardian

Except as provided in Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, a
3

parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor
child when the injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another. Any civil action may be maintained against the person causing the
injury or death or, if the person is employed by another person who is
responsible for that person's conduct, also against the employer. If a
parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian is the alleged
defendant in an action for the death or injury of a child, a guardian ad litem
may be appointed for the injured child or a child other than the deceased
child according to the procedures outlined in Section 78-7-9.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-102 (Previously Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs allege that as a result of medical negligence committed in the State of
Utah, their full term baby boy was stillborn. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), the law
and place of the negligence applies to all substantive issues in case. Therefore, the law of
Utah applies.
Plaintiffs argue that their child died because he was post mature, meaning the baby
was alive up to and beyond the time that he reached full term. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant breached the applicable standards of care setting forth reasonable precautions
and measures required by the facts of this case.
Plaintiffs evoked Utah's wrongful death statute as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §
78-11-6 in bringing their claim. Plaintiffs requested non-economic damages for the
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wrongful death of their child.
Defendant filed its Motion in Limine and requested that "any evidence concerning
damages for the wrongful death of their unborn cliild is inadmissible at trial because none
of these damages are cognizable Utah law.'5 Defendant's Motion in Limine (Doc. 21),
Carranza v. United States, Case No. 2:07cv00291, United States District Court, District of
Utah at 1-2. Defendant further argued in its supporting memorandum that "an unborn
fetus is not a 'minor child' under Utah law and Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for
the wrongful death of their unborn child." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion in Limine (Doc. 22 at 3).
Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Supreme Court.
(Doc. 26). This motion was granted by Judge Dale A. Kimball in his Memorandum
Decision and Order Certifying Question to Utah Supreme Court. (Doc. 31).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On or about April 14, 2006, Plaintiff Sanchez, nine months pregnant, had

an appointment with Dr. George Delaney at the Mountainlands Community Health Center
("MCHC"), located in Provo, Utah. (Doc. 2 at 3).
2.

Plaintiff Sanchez had experienced various complications and was subjected

to various risks during this pregnancy that concerned her and that should have elicited a
5

higher standard of care from her treating physicians at MCHC. Id.
3.

Treatment notes indicate that the treating physicians at MCHC were aware

that Sanchez had suffered from preeclampsia during her first two pregnancies and they
suspected that she may have had preeclampsia in this pregnancy. Plaintiff was 39 years
old at the time of this pregnancy and as such, her pregnancy was considered a high risk
pregnancy which elicits a higher standard of care and caution. Id.
4.

Additionally, an ultrasound performed by Dr. Donna S. Dizon-Townson,

MD, on February 28, 2006, revealed that the baby may have had an ailment referred to as
"double bubble" in the abdomen which raised concerns of a possibility of duodenal
atresia and the potential for Down's Syndrome. In her report, Dr. Dizon-Townson stated
that during prolonged observation of the fetus on ultrasound, she felt the "double bubble"
had resolved and the stomach appeared to be within normal limits but that it was possible
that the baby may have had pyloric stenosis or a partial obstruction with intermittent
resolution. Id- at 3-4.
5.

Additionally Dr. Dizon-Townson counseled Plaintiff Sanchez that the child

was at an increased risk for genetic aneuploidy based on her advanced maternal age,
abnormal serum marker screen, and an abnormal ultrasound. Id. at 4.
6.

Plaintiff Sanchez was concerned about the baby's heart rate and expressed
6

these concerns to Dr. Delaney at the time of her April 14, 2006 visit. A few weeks before
her April 14, 2006 visit with Dr. Delaney, Plaintiff Sanchez had an appointment with
Monica Sanchez, APRN, of MCHC, where Monica Sanchez, APRN, told Plaintiff that
her baby's heartbeat sounded a little weak. Plaintiff Sanchez and her husband, Plaintiff
Carranza, asked Monica Sanchez, APRN, why the heartbeat sounded weak. Ms. Sanchez
told them that it was due to the positioning of the baby in the womb. On Plaintiffs April
14,2006 visit, Dr. Delaney told Plaintiff that the heart rate remained low, but was normal
at this phase of the pregnancy and that Plaintiff Sanchez had nothing to be concerned
about. Id.
7.

At this April 14, 2006 appointment with Defendant Delaney, Plaintiff

Sanchez expressed concerned about the fact that she had already lost her mucus plug and
that she was experiencing erratic, heavy vaginal bleeding and erratic, strong contractions.
M.
8.

At the time of the appointment, Plaintiff Sanchez told Dr. Delaney that,

based on her experience with the delivery of her first two children and her need to be
induced with those deliveries, she felt the loss of her mucus plug, the bleeding, the
irregular contractions, the presence of a reduced heart rate, and the fact that she was only
one day short of being forty weeks pregnant, were all signs that it was time for her to be
7

induced. Id. at 4-5.
9.

Plaintiff Sanchez requested that she be induced immediately. Id. at 5.

10.

Despite the numerous indicators that Plaintiff Sanchez should be admitted

to the hospital for induction, including the loss of her mucus plug, the erratic and
heavy bleeding, the erratic and strong contractions, the fact that she was forty weeks
pregnant, the fact that she was thirty-nine years old, her concern over her baby's weak
heartbeat, as well as her experience in her first two pregnancies where she had to be
induced, Dr. Delaney negligently told Plaintiff Sanchez that if it were actually time for
her to have the baby that she would hurt much more than she did at that time and that her
contractions would be more regular. Id.
11.

Sanchez again informed Dr. Delaney that her contractions are never regular

at the time of her deliveries and that she was in fact quite uncomfortable at this time. Id.
12.

Dr. Delaney assured Sanchez that her baby was very strong and that she

should not worry. Dr. Delaney negligently ignored Sanchez's request to be induced and
the other above described indicators that she and her unborn child were in distress and
instead sent Plaintiff Sanchez home without perforating a stress test or satisfying
Sanchez's concerns. Id.
14.

Dr. Delaney negligently set another appointment for Sanchez ten day later,
8

which would have been a week and half past her due date. Id. at 5-6.
15.

On April 19,2006, Sanchez continued to feel strong erratic contractions.

Plaintiff Sanchez checked into Utah Valley Regional Medical Center located in Provo,
Utah. She arrived on April 19, 2006 at 10:30 a.m., at which time she received an
ultrasound; no heartbeats where found and the baby was diagnosed as deceased. Id. at 6.
16.

Dr. Vernon White of MCHC was Sanchez's attending physician and

advised that the baby be delivered normally, without the aid of a medical induction. Id.
17.

When Sanchez was unable to give birth for many hours and after suffering

the physical and emotional pain associated with a prolonged delivery and the knowledge
that her child was already dead, Plaintiff Sanchez prevailed upon Defendants to medically
induce the labor. Id.
18.

The child did not show signs of Down's Syndrome or other defects and was

otherwise healthy and viable. Id.
19.

Plaintiffs filed suit on May 3, 2007.

20.

Following some discovery Defendant's filed their Motion and

Memorandum in Limine to Exclude from Trial all Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs'
damages for Wrongful Death on April 2, 2009. Doc. 21.
21.

On May 14, 2009, Judge Dale A. Kimball of the Utah District Court issued
9

his Memorandum Decision and Order Certifying Question to Utah Supreme Court. (Doc.
31.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Based on the Utah legislature's explicit and implicit commitment to protecting
unborn children, Utah's wrongful death statute can most reasonably be interpreted to
allow for a cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn child.
ARGUMENT
The dispute between the parties in this case focuses on the meaning of the term
"minor child" in Utah's wrongful death statute codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6.
The statute does not define the term "minor child" and there is no provision excluding an
unborn child from the definition of "minor child." The statute is therefore ambiguous.
While the statute is ambiguous, the legislature's intent to protect the unborn is clear.
Given the Utah legislature's stated commitment to protecting unborn children, the term
"minor child" should be interpreted to encompass a unborn child.
A.

The legislature's use of the term "minor child59 in Utah Code Ann. § 7811-6 is ambiguous and therefore the Court may properly consider
relevant policy considerations in determining the intent of the
legislature.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that "a statute is ambiguous 'if the terms used . .

10

. may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings."' R&R Industrial Park,
L.L.C. v. The Utah Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Assoc. 199 P.3d 917, 923
(Utah 2008) (internal citations omitted). Once a statute is deemed to be ambiguous the
court may then "use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy and legislative intent to
guide [its] analysis." Id.
Here, the term "minor child" is ambiguous because it can plausibly be understood
to include unborn children, especially because the term is not defined by the legislature
and where there is no provision excluding an unborn child from the definition of "minor
child."
B.

The Utah legislature has explicitly demonstrated its commitment to
protect the unborn.

The Utah legislature has explicitly and clearly demonstrated its commitment to
protecting unborn children. In the preamble to the criminal code's abortion provisions,
the legislature states that "the state of Utah has a compelling interest in the protection of
the lives of unborn children," and "[i]t is the intent of the legislature to protect and
guarantee to unborn children their inherent and inalienable right to life as required by
Aiticle I, Sections 1 and 7, Utah Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-301.1(2) and (3).
Defendant argues that if the legislature had intended for plaintiffs to be able to

11

recover damages for the wrongful death of unborn children then it would have used the
words "unborn child" in the wrongful death statute. See Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion in Limine (Doc. 22) at 4-5. Defendant then cites to other parts of the
code where the legislature has used the term "unborn child" to show that when the
legislature wants to protect unborn children it uses the precise words to do so. .Id.
For example, under Utah's probate code, "a parent may represent and bind the
parent's unborn child if a conservator or guardian for the child has not been appointed."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6). Likewise, under Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22627(3)(a)(I), an emergency medical condition" is defined as "placing the insured's health
or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child, in
serious jeopardy."
Plaintiff interprets these statutes as further evidence of the legislature's
commitment to protect the unborn. These measures each seek to protect the rights of the
unborn child. In the probate code, unborn children are enabled to be represented in a
probate proceeding, while Utah Code Annotated § 31 A-22-627(3)(a)(I) provides
assistance to unborn children with respect to access to emergency medical care.
The legislature is expansive and liberal in granting protections and rights to the
unborn rather than being restrictive. Therefore a narrow interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
12

§ 78-11-6 which would lessen protection of the unborn would be incompatible with the
legislature's stated commitment to policies protecting the unborn.
C.

The legislature is committed to holding individuals responsible for
harming the unborn.

Under Utah's criminal code, a person commits "criminal homicide if he
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental
state otherwise specified in the statute, causes the death of another human being,
including an unborn child at any stage of its development." Utah Code Ann. §76-5201(1).
If the legislature intended to hold individuals criminally responsible for the death
of an unborn child, then it would logically and morally follow that the legislature also
intends to hold individuals civilly responsible when their negligent actions cause the
death of an unborn child.
While the legislature has at times used the term "unborn child" to add clarity with
respect to who is affected by certain laws, it does not logically or morally follow that
failure do so necessarily means unborn children are not to be protected. This is
particularly true when the legislature has affirmatively stated a duty to protect the unborn.
While the legislature has a duty to be clear in its usage of words it is not uncommon for
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many people, including legislators to consider of fully developed or viable unborn babies
as children or persons.
D.

Finding that Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 allows a claim for the wrongful
death of an unborn child would not violate the principle of state decisis.

Although there is no Utah case that has decided whether a wrongful death claim
may be made for the death of an unborn child under § 78-11-6 since it was amended in
2003 to include the phrase "minor child", there are older cases which have addressed the
subject generally. Plaintiffs assert that a review of these cases shows that the Court is
clearly not bound by these prior decisions and seems to be moving towards the national
majority position which allows such claims to be made.
The first Utah case to address this issue is Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah
1942). In Webb, the plaintiff brought an action for assault and battery that resulted in a
miscarriage. The Utah Supreme Court held that:
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are actionable, and compensation may be
awarded for the physical and metal sufferings by a woman who has a miscarriage
by reason of injuries caused by the wrongful acts of others, damages are not
awarded for "loss of the unborn child" itself.
Id. at 119 (Utah 1942).
Thirty-three years after Webb, the Utah Supreme Court decided Nelson v.
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975). In Nelson, the Court upheld the holding in Webb
14

that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek damages for the wrongful death of her unborn
child. Id. at 1077.
However, the Court in Nelson then allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence of
the mother's "mental suffering experienced by a woman undergoing such an experience."
Id. Similarly, the court in Nelson allowed the defendant to introduce evidence that the
deceased child was illegitimate and that the plaintiff was a welfare recipient even though
the trial court had granted plaintiffs pre-trial motion to bar defendant from doing. Id.
When a defense witness testified that the deceased child was illegitimate and that
the plaintiff was a welfare recipient the trial court justified its refusal to grant plaintiffs
request for a mistrial as follows:
She is here claiming great mental anguish because of the loss of the child. I think
the fact that it was an illegitimate child might very well have a bearing upon that
very thing. Id. At 1077.
The Utah Supreme Court in Nelson concluded that "the jury was entitled to know
all the circumstances if they were fairly to appraise the quantum of mental anguish which
[the mother] suffered" including the fact that the mother had seven other children and the
fact that the child was illegitimate. See Id.
In summary, the Court in Nelson holds that a wrongful death claim may not be
made for an unborn child but then allows evidence into trial that is essentially impossible
15

to differentiate from the type of evidence normally presented in wrongful death cases.
Specifically, the jury in Nelson was allowed to consider evidence that the mother plaintiff
may have been less entitled for recovery for the loss of her child because she had a lot of
children already, was unmarried, and poor; meaning, impliedly, that her emotional loss
would be less that an married affluent woman who had no other children.
The Court in Nelson held that when trying to fairly appraise the amount of mental
anguish suffered by a Plaintiff who loses an unborn child, "the jury is entitled to know all
the circumstances." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1077.
Again, the decision in Nelson is self-contradictory in that it held that there could
be no claim for the wrongful death of an unborn child but then the Court allowed
extensive wrongful death-type evidence to be introduced.
The Nelson decision was decided by a four to one vote with Justice Maughan
authoring a compelling dissent:
. . . we would not do an injustice to stare decisis for the reason that the concept
advanced by [Webb v. Snow] is no longer a part of the weight of authority in this
country. Additionally, I see no moral, biological, or legal rationale for sustaining
an outmoded, dry, rule laced with the fictions of a bygone era.
Nelson, at 1079.
Justice Maughan's dissent in 1975 is even more accurate today as at least 36 states

16

recognize the right of heirs to make a wrongful death claim for an unborn child. See
Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embryo: Why Illinois is on the
Cutting Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embryonic Legal Rights, 19
Regent U.L. Rev. 251, footnotes, 40, 41, and 42 and Primer on Legal Recognition &
Protection of Unborn & Newly Born, Defending Life 2009, available at
http ://dl.aul.org/ub w/primer-on-legal-recognition- and-protection-of-the-unbomand-newly-bom, (copies attached).
The most recent Utah case discussing a possible wrongful death claim for an
unborn child is State Farm v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (1996). In Clyde, Mr. and Mrs.
Clyde's minor daughter was killed in an automobile accident. The minor daughter was
pregnant at the time of the accident and her unborn child also died. The primary issue
before the Court in Clyde was whether the grandparents had standing to make a wrongful
death claim for the unborn child. The Court held that under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6,
the Clydes, as grandparents, did not have standing to make a wrongful death claim on
behalf of the unborn child. Id. at 1186. In making this finding the Court noted:
Because we conclude that the Clydes do not have standing to maintain an action
for the wrongful death of their unborn grandchild, we need not decide the more
general question of whether the death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for
maintaining an action under section 78-11-6.
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Id at n. 4.
Based on this language, the Utah Supreme Court in Clyde considers the question
of whether the death of an unborn child may be the basis of a claim under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-11-6 to be unresolved. Had the Supreme Court taken the position that the
death of an unborn child could never be the basis for a claim under Utah Code Ann. § 7811-6 it could have easily resolved the case before it in that way.
Similarly, the Court, after determining the Clydes did not have standing, could
have simply indicated that the death of the unborn grandchild could not have been the
basis for a claim under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 and then directly cited to the Webb
case. However, instead of stating "see Webb v. Snow" the court used the abbreviation
"Cf." as in uCf. Webb v. Snow" meaning compare to Webb v. Snow which indicates that
there are differences between the two positions and that there remained a "more general
question" that did not need to be decided at that time. See Id.
Due to the Court's decision to not answer the "more general question" of whether
the death of an unborn child may be the basis for a wrongful death claim in Utah, the
current Supreme Court is not bound by stare decisis when detennining the intent of the
legislature.

18

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court rule that a wrongful
death claim may be maintained for the death of an unborn child.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2009.
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD

Brett R. Boulton
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ADDENDUM
1.

Memorandum Decision, Judge Dale A. Kimball, United States District

Court, District of Utah.
2.

Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embiyo: Why Illinois

is on the Cutting Edge ofDetermining a Definitive Standard for Embiyonic Legal Rights,
19 Regent U.L. Rev. 251.
3.

Primer on Legal Recognition & Protection of Unborn & Newly Born,

Defending Life 2009.
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ADDENDUM 1
Memorandum Decision, Judge Dale A. Kimball,
United States District Court, District of Utah.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

MIGUEL CARRANZA and AMELIA
SANCHEZ, natural parents of Jesna M.V.
Carranza-Sanchez, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTION TO
UTAH SUPREME COURT

vs.
Case No 2:07CV291DAK
UNITED STATES and John and Jane
Does I-X,

Judge Dale A Kimball

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on two interrelated motions (1) Defendant Umted States
of Amenca's Motion in Limine to Exclude From Trial All Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs Miguel
Carranza and Amelia Sanchez's Damages for Wrongful Death, and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to
Certify Question of Law to the Utah Supreme Court The court held a hearing on the motions on
May 12, 2009 At the hearing, Plaintiffs were represented by Brett R Boulton and Defendant
was represented by Amy J Oliver and Jeffrey E Nelson After careful consideration of the
parties' memoranda and arguments made at the hearing, as well as the facts and law relevant to
the present motions, the court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order

BACKGROUND
Between December 28, 2005, and April 19, 2006, Plaintiff Amelia Sanchez received
prenatal care at the Mountainlands Community Health Center in Provo, Utah. Mountainlands
and its contracted physicians and employees are deemed to be employees of the United States
government by the Health Resources and Services Administration and Bureau of Primary Health
Care, in accordance with Section 224(g) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(g) as
amended by the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-73), for
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
On April 19, 2006, Sanchez went to the Labor and Delivery Department at Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center where it was determined that the fetus exhibited no movement or
heartbeat. Sanchez's labor was induced, and she gave birth to a stillborn male on April 20, 2006.
Factually, the parties dispute whether medical negligence occurred in this case. Plaintiffs
argue that the fetus died because he was post mature, meaning that the baby was alive up to and
beyond the time that he reached full term. Plaintiffs allege that medical professionals at
Mountainlands breached the applicable standards of care by not monitoring her condition more
closely in her final weeks of pregnancy and not inducing labor at her doctor's visit on April 14,
2006. At that visit, Sanchez had lost her mucous plug and informed her doctor that she was
experiencing vaginal bleeding and erratic contractions. Her doctor, however, did not induce her.
The United States' expert witness, Dr. Later, states that "the cause of stillborn was a
nuchal cord event, which unfortunately is unavoidable." Dr. Later states that the loss of a
mucous plug and irregular contractions are common several days before delivery and are not an
indication to proceed with an immediate induction. The expert's report notes that Sanchez called
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Mountainlands three days after her doctor's visit, on April 17, 2006, complaining of contractions
and discharge. She was told to go to Labor & Delivery, but she did not go until April 19, 2009.
Dr. Later opines that even had she gone to the hospital on April 17, findings may have been
normal and the cord accident may have still occurred later as it did. He states that cord accidents
are not age-related and cannot be predicted.
Plaintiffs present action against the United States is brought pursuant to the FTCA. See
28 U.S.C. § 1346 etseq. The FTCA authorizes actions against the United States for damages
caused by the negligence of government employees under circumstances where a private person
would be liable under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The United States is liable to the same
extent as a private individual in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
On October 12, 2006, in accordance with the regulations implementing the FTCA,
Plaintiffs filed the requisite "Standard Form 95-Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death" with the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1). The Standard
Form 95 is designed for any type of claim that can be asserted under the FTCA. The Standard
Form 95, therefore, provides boxes or sections for the claimant to state the nature and extent of
the claim. The boxes describing the claims are then followed by boxes allowing the claimant to
identify the amount of damages sought in connection with the claim.
The relevant section provided on the Standard Form 95 for a description of the claim
relevant in this case was pre-printed "personal injury/wrongful death." Under this section,
Plaintiffs stated that the nature and extent of the claim was: "Death of Claimaint's unborn son,
Jesua Miguel Valentin Carranza-Sanchez, as a result of medical malpractice. See Addendum."
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Plaintiffs attached a four-page Addendum providing a narrative of the nature and extent of their
claim Plaintiffs' Addendum states "Notice is hereby given by Amelia Sanchez and Miguel
Carranza

of their intent to commence a medical malpractice action against Mountamlands

Community Health Center" and the healthcare professionals providing Sanchez prenatal care
who were deemed employees of Mountamlands The Addendum provides a paragraph identified
as "Nature of Claim " Under this heading, Plaintiffs state "Sanchez and Carranza's claim is
based upon the negligent care of the above named health care providers and health care facility
and those who may have assisted them m treating Sanchez and her unborn child " The
Addendum then gives a factual description of Sanchez's medical conditions, prenatal care, and
delivery Plaintiffs state that because there was a nuchal cord entanglement, which consisted of
the cord wrapping one time around the baby's throat, the doctor told Plaintiffs' that an autopsy
would not be necessary Pathology examined the baby and the placenta and observed no fetal
anomalies
Plaintiffs' Addendum concludes with a paragraph entitled "Nature of Injuries and
Damages " Under this heading, Plaintiffs state that as a result of the medical negligence,
"Plaintiffs, as parents of the deceased, have suffered the injuries described above, including
funeral expenses and general damages of pam and suffering, loss of affection, loss of
companionship, and loss of happiness of association "
Under the section for "Amount of Claim" on the Standard Form 95, the form provides
boxes for "property damage," "personal injury," "wrongful death," and a "total amount " In this
damages section, Plaintiffs identified $1,000,000 of damages in the "wrongful death" box, and
$1,000,000 in the "total amount" box Plaintiffs did not list any damages under "personal
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injury."
After Plaintiffs submitted their Standard Form 95, the claim was deemed denied because
six months passed without a formal denial by HHS. The denial of their claim allowed Plaintiffs
to bring their action in this court. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges only one cause of
action entitled medical negligence. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed "to reasonably and
adequately provide medical care to Plaintiff Sanchez during her pregnancy." First Am. Compl. %
26. Although the claim is styled as a medical negligence claim, many of the allegations and
requested damages refer to a wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs allege that
[a]s a direct, proximate, and foreseeable consequence and cause of
the aforementioned negligence, acts, failures to act, refusals to act,
and breaches of duty on the part of Defendants, Plaintiffs, as the
surviving natural parents of the deceased, have personally suffered
and will continue to suffer loss of companionship, loss of
association, loss of advice, loss of counsel, loss of comfort, lost of
happiness of association, and other noneconomic and general
damages for the wrongful death of their child in such amounts as
the Plaintiffs will establish at the trial hereof. Plaintiffs are entitled
to recover all economic and noneconomic damages, together with
such other damages as may be provided under Utah's wrongful
death statute of § 78-11-7 and other applicable law, from the
Defendants.
Id. Tf 28. Plaintiffs prayer for relief seeks damages against Defendants: "a. for general damages
for Plaintiffs conscious and unconscious pain and suffering from the date of the death of their
child in a reasonable amount;" "b. for general and noneconomic damages for the wrongful death
of their child in a reasonable amount;" and "c. for special damages for medical, funeral, and
burial expenses incurred as a result of injuries to and the wrongful death of their child as
proven."
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ANALYSIS
Defendant's motion in limine asks this court to preclude Plaintiffs from testifying as to
any alleged damages of loss of companionship, loss of association, loss of advice, loss of
comfort, loss of happiness of association, and other noneconomic and general damages for the
wrongful death of their unborn child because none of these damages are cognizable under Utah
law. Defendant argues that the court should exclude any evidence related to damages associated
with a wrongful death cause of action because there is no claim of action under Utah law for the
wrongful death of an unborn child.
Plaintiffs, however, contend that this court should recognize a cause of action for the
wrongful death of an unborn child and allow Plaintiffs to testify to the associated damages.
Plaintiffs brought a Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Utah Supreme Court asking this
court to certify the question of whether Utah's wrongful death statute allows a wrongful death
cause of action for an unborn child. Plaintiffs argue that the question presents a controlling issue
of law in this case and there appears to be no controlling Utah law. Plaintiffs ask this court to
stay its ruling on Defendant's motion in limine until the Utah Supreme Court has acted on the
order of certification.
Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "the Utah Supreme
Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States when
requested to do so by such certifying court. . . if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a
proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain." Utah R. App. P. 41(a). The certification
order must state the "question of law to be answered," "that the question certified is a controlling
issue of law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court," and "that there appears to be no
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controlling Utah law." Id. 41(c). Courts have found that certification is appropriate "when the
case concerns a matter of vital public concern, where the issue will likely recur in other cases,
where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the case, and where
the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the issue."
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
As demonstrated by the parties competing motions, both parties in this case seek a
determination of whether Utah law allows a wrongful death action for an unborn child prior to
trial. The court, therefore, must determine whether Utah law is uncertain on the issue of whether
a cause of action exists for the wrongful death of an unborn child.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "'the right of action to recover damages for
death is not a common-law right, but is one created by statute.'" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1996) (quoting Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557,
560 (Utah 1924)). "The Utah wrongful death act was originally passed by the Territorial
Legislature in 1874 to remedy the harsh effects of the common law rule which did not recognize
wrongful death actions at all." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179, 1184 (Utah
1983). Under Utah's wrongful death statute, as it existed at the time of the case in question, "a
parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child when the injury
or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (2006)
amended and renumbered by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-102 (2008) (changing language from
"may maintain" to "may bring") (emphasis added).
The dispute between the parties in this case focuses on the meaning of the term "minor
child." The statute does not define the term "minor child." In interpreting a statute, courts "look
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first to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning." H. U.F. v. V.P. W.9 203 P.2d 943,
951 (Utah 2009). When determining the meaning of a statute's plain language, "[i]t is presumed
t h a t . . . the words and phrases were chosen carefully and advisedly." Amax Magnesium Corp. v.
Tax Comm 'n9 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). Defendant argues that the plain language of the
wrongful death statute provides a wrongful death action for only a minor child, not an unborn
child. Plaintiffs, however, assert that a full-term unborn child could be considered a minor child
under the statute. There is no provision specifically excluding an unborn child from the
definition of minor child.
Defendant contends it is clear that the Utah Legislature did not intend for plaintiffs to
recover damages for the wrongful death of or injury to an unborn child because the legislature
omitted the words "unborn child" from the wrongful death statute. Defendant contrasts this
omission of "unborn child" in the wrongful death statute with legislature's use of the term
"unborn child" in other provisions of the Utah Code. Under Utah's probate code, "a parent may
represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn child if a conservator or guardian for the child
has not been appointed." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6) (emphasis added). Under Utah Code
Annotated Section 31A-22-627(3)(a)(i), an "emergency medical condition" is defined as "placing
the insured's health or, with respect to a pregnant women, the health of the women or her unborn
child, in serious jeopardy." (Emphasis added.) Also, under Utah's criminal code, a person
commits "criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence,
or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute, causes the death of another human
being, including an unborn child at any stage of its development" Id. § 76-5-201(1) (emphasis
added)).
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Plaintiffs argue that if the legislature intended to hold individuals criminally responsible
for the death of an unborn child, then it would logically and morally follow that the legislature
also intended to hold individuals civilly responsible when their wrongful actions cause the death
of an unborn child. Plaintiffs contend that while the legislature has at times used the term
"unborn child" to add clarity with respect to who is affected by certain laws, a failure to do so
does not necessarily mean unborn children are not to be protected.
Plaintiffs assert that while there are instances of the term "unborn child" being
specifically used by the legislature in other provisions of the Utah Code, there are also other
provisions of the code demonstrating the legislature's commitment to protecting the rights of
unborn children. Plaintiffs specifically point to the preamble to the criminal code's abortion
provisions, which states that "the state of Utah has a compelling interest in the protection of the
lives of unborn children," and "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature to protect and guarantee to
unborn children their inherent and inalienable right to life as required by Article I, Sections 1 and
7, Utah Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-301.1(2) and (3).
In reviewing a separate, but related, issue under Utah's Wrongful Death statute, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that it did not need to "decide the more general question of whether the
death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for maintaining an action under Section 78-11-6."
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1187 n.8 (Utah 1996). In Clyde, the
court analyzed whether an unborn child's grandparents had standing to bring a wrongful death
action under the wrongful death statute. Id. at 1185. The Clyde court addressed this issue in the
context of whether the grandparents were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits after the
death of their minor daughter and her unborn child. Id.
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The Clyde court stated that "[bjecause the legislature has authorized only the 'parent or
guardian' of a minor child to maintain an action for the child's wrongful death, the Clydes may
not maintain an action unless they qualify as the parents or guardians of [their daughter's] unborn
child." Id. at 1185. The Clydes asserted that because they provided their daughter's, "and
therefore her unborn child's, sole means of support, they stood in loco parentis to the unborn
child and should be treated as de facto parents or guardians under section 78-11-6." Id. The
court concluded that it did not need to look past the plain language of the statute "to conclude
that the Clydes do not qualify as the parents or guardians of [their daughter's] unborn child." Id.
at 1186. The court found the term parent to mean only an immediate parent, not a grandparent.
Id.
The Clyde court also supported its conclusion by reasoning that the legislature's "failure
to expressly include persons standing in loco parentis within the class of potential plaintiffs
under section 78-11-6 appears to have been an intentional rejection" because the legislature had
"used the term 'in loco parentis' in several unrelated statutes." Id. at 1187. The court found "that
the legislature knew how to use the term 'in loco parentis' but chose not to do so in section 78-1-6
and therefore did not intend to allow persons standing in loco parentis to maintain an action for
the wrongful death of a minor." Id. The court concluded its analysis by explaining thai '"[t]he
fact that the result in some circumstances may be to unreasonably restrict the class of persons
who can bring a wrongful death action is an argument for amendment of the statute, not for our
ignoring its words.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Most relevant to the present case, the Clyde court then included its footnote stating that
because the Clydes did not have standing to maintain an action for the wrongful death of their
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unborn grandchild, it did not need to decide whether the death of an unborn child could ever
provide the basis for a wrongful death action. The court's footnote cites to two previous Utah
Supreme court cases. The court cited to Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah 1942), in which
the court found that no damages are available for the loss of an unborn child, and the dissent in
Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Utah 1975), criticizing Webb.
Defendant asserts that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Clyde is consistent with its
position that Utah law does not recognize a wrongful death action for an unborn child. Plaintiffs,
however, assert that the Clyde court's footnote clearly indicated that the question was not settled.
The Clyde court's reasoning is similar to Defendant's reasoning in this case. The plain language
of the statute states only minor child and does not include unborn child. The fact that the
legislature used minor child or unborn child in other statutes and not in the wrongful death statute
indicates that the legislature did not intend to include an action for unborn children under the
wrongful death statute. In addition, the argument for inclusion of unborn children under the
wrongful death statute is an argument for an amendment of the statute, not for broadly
interpreting its words or writing in words that are not present.
The court agrees that the Utah Supreme Court could apply the reasoning of Clyde to the
question at hand. The definition of minor child, however, does not appear to be as plain or clear
as the definition of parent. Also, significantly, the Clyde court chose to address whether the
grandparents had standing to assert the cause of action instead of simply stating that no such
cause of action existed under Utah law. Additionally, the Clyde court's footnote indicates that
the court does not consider the issue settled. The court could have cited to Webb and Nelson for
the proposition that the issue was settled, as Defendant suggests. But, instead, the court cited to
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Webb and Nelson's dissent criticizing Webb.
In Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942), in which the plaintiff brought an action for
assault and battery that resulted in a miscarriage, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are
actionable, and compensation may be awarded for
the physical and mental sufferings by a woman who
has a miscarriage by reason of injuries caused by the
wrongful acts of others, damages are not awarded
for "loss of the unborn child" itself.
Id. at 119.
In Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff "appealed from an
adverse judgment based in an action for the wrongful death of a full-term fetus together with
damages for pain and suffering allegedly caused by the negligent care of plaintiff in connection
with the delivery of her stillborn baby." Id. at 1076. The Utah Supreme Court found the
plaintiffs appeal of the trial court's refusal to permit recovery for the wrongful death of a fullterm fetus to be without merit as a result of Webb. Id. at 1077. The court found that the plaintiff
could not complain about the trial court's instruction allowing her to be awarded compensation
"for her mental distress even though the death of the fetus was not caused by a battery or by
wilful misconduct." Id. But the court found the question of damages moot because the jury did
not find the defendants negligent. Id. The court, however, stated that "[c]ertainly the death of a
viable fetus should be considered as much a ground for damages as would a miscarriage.
Whether or not it gives a different basis for recovery can be determined when liability has been
found in a proper case." Id. at 1077-78.
The dissent in Nelson found the plaintiffs appeal well taken and criticized the majority
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opinion's reliance on Webb. Id. at 1079 (Maughan, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that Webb
was "not applicable for two reasons: First, the operative facts are completely distinguishable;
and we would not do an injustice to stare decisis for the reason that the concept advanced by that
case is no longer a part of the weight of authority in this country." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting).
The dissent further argued that there was "no moral, biological, or legal rationale for sustaining
an outmoded, dry rule laced with the fictions of a bygone era." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting).
The court referred to an Oregon state case where the court "rejected the view that an unborn child
has no judicial existence apart from its mother and cites those cases representing the weight of
authority in this country sustaining the court's opinion." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting).
That the Clyde court would cite to Webb and the dissent in Nelson while stating that it
need not determine whether the death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for a wrongful death
action convinces this court that the Utah Supreme Court views the issue as unsettled. As
recognized by the dissent in Nelson, Webb is not necessarily controlling of the issue. The Webb
case involved an assault and battery claim, not a wrongful death claim. As a result, the Webb
court does not cite to or refer to the wrongful death statute. And, factually, the Webb case
involved a pregnancy at its very early stages, not a full-term fetus as in Nelson and the present
case. Nelson's reliance on Webb as binding is, therefore, questionable. And, the Clyde court's
citation to Nelson's dissent calls Nelson's holding into question.
Moreover, unlike this case, the Nelson court was reviewing the issue after a jury had
determined that the defendants were not negligent. In this case, the court must determine
whether evidence of damages relating to a wrongful death action can be presented at trial. The
court agrees with the parties that the issue should be determined prior to trial. While Defendant
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opposes certification of the question to the Utah Supreme Court, it does so only on the grounds
that the question of law is settled. Defendant's motion in limine seeks the issue relating to
wrongful death damages to be determined prior to trial. If the court were to wait to certify the
question until a determination was made as to medical negligence in this case, the court would
potentially be required to hold two trials in the matter. Judicial economy, therefore, supports a
finding that the question should be certified and determined before the parties and court incur the
expenditures of time and money associated with trial.
Because the issue of whether Utah's wrongful death statute allows a wrongful death
action for an unborn child is controlling of the motion in limine pending before the court and the
court finds that there is no controlling Utah law, the court concludes that it is appropriate to
certify the question to the Utah Supreme Court. This is an important issue of public policy and
will likely recur. Moreover, certification of the issue "would further the interest of comity and
federalism by giving the Utah Supreme Court an opportunity to answer it in the first instance
should it elect to do so under Utah R. App. P. 41." See Ohio Cas. Ins. v. Unigardlns. Co., 2009
WL 1160297 at *5 (10th Cir. April 28, 2009).
Defendant's motion in limine also raises the issue of whether plaintiffs can assert
damages other than wrongful death damages. Plaintiffs argue that Nelson stands for the
proposition that evidence of the mother's mental anguish or suffering is admissible whether or
not the court finds that the unborn child is covered by Utah's wrongful death statute. 542 P.2d at
1077. Defendants, however, argue that not only can Plaintiffs not recover damages for wrongful
death, they cannot recover any other damages related to a broader claim of medical negligence
because Plaintiffs' Standard Form 95 stated damages only under the wrongful death category, not
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under the personal injury category.
If Plaintiffs had a "general claim for noneconomic damages from the loss of their child"
that was distinct from their "more specific claim for noneconomic damages as provided by
Utah's wrongful death statute," Defendant contends that they were required to indicate on their
Standard Forms 95 a sum for those damages that were not wrongful death damages. "The
[FTCA] requires that each claim and claimant meet the prerequisites for maintaining a suit
against the government.... If the claimant fails to provide a sum certain within the claim, the
administrative claim fails to meet the statutory prerequisite to maintaining a suit against the
government, and leaves the district court without jurisdiction to hear the case." See Turner ex
rel Turner v. United States, 514 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation
omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675.
Even though Plaintiffs failed to fill in a specific value for personal injury damages, their
Addendum to Standard Form 95, stated that "as a result of the [doctors'] negligence, Plaintiffs . .
. have suffered the injuries described above, including funeral expenses and general damages of
pain and suffering, loss of affection, loss of companionship, and loss of happiness of association.
Plaintiffs argue that they did not put an amount for personal injury damages because Sanchez did
not suffer any personal injury. Plaintiffs claim that their damages were mental anguish resulting
from the alleged wrongful death of their unborn child. Plaintiffs damages for medical negligence
and wrongful death are interrelated given that the result of the alleged medical negligence was
the death of Plaintiff s unborn child. Plaintiffs gave an exhaustive description of those claims in
their Addendum.
Given the level of detail provided in Plaintiffs' Addendum and the interrelated nature of

15

the damages, the court finds no prejudice to the government from Plaintiffs' failure to list
damages in the personal injury category. The court concludes that Plaintiffs' Standard Form 95
and their attached Addendum adequately notified Defendant that Plaintiffs were bringing a
medical negligence claim with associated damages, not just a wrongful death claim.
Accordingly, the court finds no jurisdictional bar to Plaintiff pursuing damages for Plaintiffs'
mental distress associated with their medical negligence claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Utah
Supreme Court is GRANTED. This court requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the
following certified question, if it elects to do so: Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an
action for the wrongful death of an unborn child?
As a result of the court's determination to certify this question to the Utah Supreme
Court, the court stays its ruling on the wrongful death damages issue raised in Defendant's
Motion in Limine to Exclude From Trial All Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs Miguel Carranza and
Amelia Sanchez's Damages for Wrongful Death until the Utah Supreme Court rules on the
certification order. The court also strikes the pending May 27, 2009 trial date. The court will
reset the trial date accordingly.
Pursuant to Rule 41(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Clerk of Court shall
transmit a copy of this certification order, under this court's official seal, to the Utah Supreme
Court. The Clerk of Court shall also certify a copy of any portion of the record in this case as
may be directed by the Utah Supreme Court.
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DATED this 14th day of May, 2009.

DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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ADDENDUM 2
Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embryo: Why Illinois is on the
Cutting Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embryonic Legal Rights, 19
Regent U.L. Rev. 251.
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COMMENT: WRONGFUL DEATH AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE PREVIABLE EMBRYO. WHY ILLINOIS IS ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF
DETERMINING A DEFINITIVE STANDARD FOR EMBRYONIC LEGAL RIGHTS
NAME: Amber N. Dina
SUMMARY:
.. The birth of Louise Joy Brown, better known as the world's first "test-tube baby," sparked a heated worldwide debate as to the
ethical and biological implications of creating human life outside the womb. ... The courts are split where, as a result of the injuries he
received, the child is subsequently stillborn . . . The reasons for recovery are compelling. A viable fetus is a human being, capable of
independent existence outside the womb, a human life is therefore destroyed when a viable fetus is killed; it is wholly irrational to
allow liability to depend on whether death from fatal injuries occurs just before or j u s t after birth; it is absurd to allow recovery for
prenatal injuries unless they are so severe as to cause death, such a situation favors the wrongdoer who causes death over the one
who merely causes injuries, and so enables the tortfeasor to foreclose his own liability. ... Because of the legislative intent behind
section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act, as well as the Abortion Law's clear definition of "human being" including the unborn child "from
the t i m e of conception," the Miller order concludes that under Illinois statutory law an embryo not yet implanted in the w o m b is j u s t
as much a human being as an embryo developing in utero. ...
H I G H L I G H T : Philosophers and theologians may debate, but there is no doubt in the mind of the Illinois Legislature when life begins.
I t begins at conception. *

TEXT:

[*251]
I. Introduction
I n 1978, a healthy baby girl was born in northern England, * a child not of traditional in vivo 3 fertilization, but rather one born as a
result of the groundbreaking technology of in vitro 4 fertilization. The birth of Louise Joy Brown, better known as the world's first
"test-tube baby," sparked a heated worldwide debate as to the ethical and biological implications of creating human life outside the
w o m b . 5 This debate continued as the United States implemented its own in vitro fertilization program at the Eastern Virginia Medical
School, 6 and when in 1 9 8 1 , Elizabeth Jordan Carr, the first American in vitro success, was born in Norfolk, Virginia. 7
To some, this technology was fnghteningly reminiscent of Aldous Huxley's prophetic vision of genetically engineered children
conceived in laboratories, while others hailed it as a medical miracle. 8 The media response initially focused on the ethical debate of
"playing God"; however, the legal implications of in vitro fertilization quickly became [ * 2 5 2 ] relevant. For example, a 1989 article in
Time magazine discussed the complex legal dilemmas raised by in vitro technology, including such questions as "Who should exercise
primary rights over the frozen embryo 7 " and "What rights, if any, does the embryo h a v e ? " 9 Today, more than twenty years after the
inception of in vitro fertilization, the courts and state legislatures still struggle with these fundamental questions
I n February 2005, in a case of first impression, a Cook County district judge chose to review an interlocutory order to determine
whether, under Illinois law, a couple could bring a wrongful death action for the destruction of their frozen preembryo. 10 The court, in
Miller v. American Infertility Group, held that a preembryo is a human being and should be given the same legal status as an embryo
developing in the womb. " That determination caused the media and legal community to probe further into the important issue of
what rights should be given to all embryos, including those cryogenically preserved.
This note will focus on the legal status of the previable embryo I t begins with an overview of the processes of in vitro fertilization and
cryopreservation. Part I I I examines the historical framework of wrongful death statutes as well as the various state statutory
approaches to the wrongful death of an embryo Part IV focuses on the struggle to define human life in Illinois, and whether, under
Illinois law, there is a wrongful death remedy for a pre-implanted embryo. Finally, Part V challenges the states to allow wrongful
death suits for all previable embryos and proposes a guide for change through model legislation.
This note will show why Miller v. American Infertility Group should be upheld, and why Illinois is on the cutting edge of establishing a
definitive standard for embryonic legal rights
I I Overview of I n Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation
Since the dawn of in vitro fertilization (IVF) in the late 1970s, there has been an explosion of reproductive technologies. While no
precise figure exists, it is believed "that more than one million babies have been born worldwide since 1978" as a result of IVF. 12 In
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the United States, approximately 400 clinics offer IVF 13 and "at least 60,000 IVF [*253] procedures are performed . . . annually,
with an average birthrate of 25%." 14
To begin the in vitro process, a woman takes fertility drugs. These fertility drugs cause the ovaries to produce several mature eggs
(as opposed to the single egg that is naturally released each normal monthly cycle). 15 After the eggs have matured, they are
removed from the ovaries by an IVF surgeon using a needle guided by ultrasound technology. 16 The harvested eggs are then placed
in a Petri dish and mixed with sperm and a special medium that assists in keeping them alive. 17 Around forty-six hours after the Petri
dish conception, a growing "embryo is a translucent, amber-colored mass of two to six cells (blastomeres)," 1S and
within 72 hours of insemination most healthy embryos will have divided into seven to nine blastomeres. . . . By 96 hours the healthy
embryo will have more than 80 blastomeres and will look like a mulberry, or morula, By 120 to 144 hours after insemination, most
viable embryos will comprise more than 100 ceils and have a fluid-filled center or blastula, and are said to be at the blastocyst stage.
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When the embryos have reached the blastocyst stage, the IVF surgeon will use a catheter to place several embryos into the uterus
where ideally they will implant and continue to grow. 20
While a normal IVF cycle can result in "one dozen to nearly three dozen eggs for fertilization," only "a few of the resulting embryos
are implanted and . . . typically the remainder are cryopreserved."21 As of May 2003, "according to a report released by the Society
for Assisted Reproductive Technology . . . , an estimated four hundred thousand embryos are suspended in cryotanks in IVF clinics
across the [United States] — the largest population of frozen embryos in the world." 22 The preembryo in Miller was similarly intended
for cryopreservation. [*254]
III. Wrongful Death Statutes
A. Historical Development of Wrongful Death Statutes
Under the English common law, no cause of action existed for wrongful death 23 because when either the tortfeasor or the victim died
prior to litigation of the claim, the claim died as well. 24 The tortfeasor paid no monetary price to the deceased victim's dependents or
heirs, making it "cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him." 25 This inconsistency in the common law meant that
"the greatest injury that one person can inflict upon another, the taking of another's life, was without civil redress." 26 The British
Parliament rectified this injustice by passing the Fatal Accident's Act of 1846, 27 commonly referred to as Lord Campbell's Act, which
allowed for civil suit by any "person answering the description of the widow, parent or child who, under the circumstances, suffers
pecuniary loss." 28
In 1847, following England's lead, New York enacted a wrongful death statute patterned after Lord Campbell's Act. 29 Currently, every
state has a statutory remedy for wrongful death that provides compensation to the victim's beneficiaries, and also provides
deterrence for negligent behavior. 30
B. History of Recovery for Injuries to the Unborn Child
During the first part of the twentieth century, a tortfeasor in the United States owed no duty to the child within a woman's womb —
only a duty to the pregnant mother. 31 Early court cases such as Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton failed to recognize any
personhood for the unborn. 32 Dietrich addressed whether a pregnant woman could bring a civil suit for the death of her child due to a
miscarriage induced by her [*255] fall on a defective sidewalk. 33 The court held that because the "unborn child was a part of the
mother at the time of injury," 34 the child had no separate cause of action for "injuries received by it while in its mother's womb." 3S
For over fifty years, the common law reflected this "single entity" view that the unborn child had no legal existence apart from the
mother.
However, in 1946, the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz rejected the notion that an unborn child is merely an extension of the mother. 36
There, a baby sustained nonfatal injuries due to professional malpractice during delivery. The District Court for the District of
Columbia denied the defendant physician's motion for summary judgment agreeing with a Canadian court's assertion that "'it is but
natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrongfully
committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother.'" 37 The court explained that a "viable child being 'part' of its mother is a
contradiction in terms" when "modern medicine is replete with cases of living children being taken from dead mothers." 38 Moreover,
the court also recognized the previabie embryo within the womb as human life, noting that "by the eighth week the embryo . . . is an
unmistakable human being, even though it is still only three-fourths of an inch long." 39
This case led the way for courts to recognize a separate action for the wrongful death of an unborn child. Today, although fourteen
states still deny recovery for the wrongful death of a child that is not born alive, 40 the majority of states allow wrongful death actions
for the death of a "viable" unborn child. 41 Six states give ultimate value in protecting [*256] human life by recognizing a claim for
the death of a "previabie" embryo. 42
C. Three Jurisdictional Approaches to the Wrongful Death of a Fetus or an Embryo
1. Live Birth
Fourteen jurisdictions apply the most stringent test for liability, which denies all recovery for the wrongful death of a child that is not
born alive. 43 Thus, a child wrongfully injured during birth will have no cause of action when a stillbirth results. On the other hand, the
"live birth" requirement is satisfied even if the child dies within a few minutes of birth. 44 This rule effectuates the standard "that if the
defendant does enough damage to terminate the life of the fetus before birth, he simply is not liable." 45 While this harsh position
does create a bright line standard, it has been criticized for lacking an "understanding about fetal development," since "the rule
assumes that a fetus cannot be considered a person . . . at any point prior to birth." 46
These minority "live birth" jurisdictions advance seemingly contradictory reasoning to "support their failure to permit a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a viable unborn child." 47 For example, in Justus v. Atchison, parents urged the California Supreme Court to
recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of two full-term children who were delivered stillborn due to medical negligence
during the course of delivery. 4S The parents argued that "because California recognizes an action for prenatal injuries if a child is born
alive, it is illogical to deny a cause of action to a different child who suffers identical prenatal injuries but dies shortly before birth

instead of shortly thereafter." 49 Nevertheless, the court's analysis centered on "whether a stillborn fetus is a 'person' within the
meaning of the California wrongful death statute." 50 The court concluded that, based on the legislative intent behind the California
statute, a full-term stillborn child is not a person. The court defended its upholding of the live birth view, stating: [ * 2 5 7 ]
In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an
action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents'
interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life . . . . In short, the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. S1

While commentators may have initially opposed those states that allow a wrongful death recovery for the viable fetus, this was a
weak argument for the California Supreme Court since at the time of the 1977 Justus decision, "twenty-five states had already
recognized the cause of action." 52 Also, because wrongful death acts compensate or even vindicate the parents for the death of their
unborn child, it does not necessarily follow that the unborn child has no intrinsic human value Other live birth jurisdictions give
similar illogical arguments and echo the poor conclusion of Justus "that a viable unborn child is not a person within the meaning" of
their state's statute. 53
In Stern v Miller, the Florida Supreme Court held that a viable unborn child is not a "'person' for purposes of [the Florida wrongful
death statute]" despite admitting that the great weight of authority supported allowing recovery. M The court noted the following
arguments in support of the majority viability position:
The courts are split where, as a result of the injuries he received, the child is subsequently stillborn . . . The reasons for recovery are
compelling A viable fetus is a human being, capable of independent existence outside the womb, a human life is therefore destroyed
when a viable fetus is killed; it is wholly irrational to allow liability to depend on whether death from fatal injuries occurs just before or
just after birth; it is absurd to allow recovery for prenatal injuries unless they are so severe as to cause death; such a situation favors
the wrongdoer who causes death over the one who merely causes injuries, and so enables the tortfeasor to foreclose his own liability.
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However, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed these compelling grounds for recognizing the viable unborn child as human life, and
instead focused on the intent of the legislature to limit recovery to a "minor child," concluding "that a stillborn fetus is not within the
statutory classification."56
Similarly, in the leading minority case of Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, Inc , the Texas Supreme Court recognized
that an [*258] unborn child has "an existence separate from its mother" and that the live birth jurisdictions are substantially
outnumbered by those states adopting the majority rule 57 Yet, the court still refused to allow a mother to collect wrongful death
damages for her child's death resulting from prenatal injuries 58
While many of the early live birth cases have been "subsequently overruled by judicial or legislative action," 59 California, Florida, and
Texas, as well as eleven other jurisdictions, still continue to hold to their minority position of no recovery for the wrongful death of an
unborn child.
2. Viability
The majority of jurisdictions do permit fetal wrongful death actions on the condition that the child is "viable" at the time of death. 60 A
viable child is one that is capable of living outside the womb 61 The concept of legal viability "was first suggested by Justice Boggs of
the Illinois Supreme Court in his dissent to Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital " 62 The majority opinion in Allaire held that an infant could
not maintain a cause of action for nonfatal injuries received within the womb However, in dissent, Justice Boggs argued that if the
child had received an injury in utero, which later after birth caused the child's death, the common law would treat this as a punishable
injury to a human being. Thus, it follows that one who inflicts nonfatal injuries on a child in the womb should also be punished: 63
The law should, it seems to me, be that whenever a child in utero is so far advanced in prenatal age as that, should by parturition by
natural or artificial means occur at such age, such child could and would live separable from the mother, and grow into the ordinary
activities of life, and is afterwards born, and becomes a living human being, such child has a right of action for any injuries wantonly
or negligently inflicted upon his or her person at such age of viability, though then in the womb of the mother. 64

In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Verkennes v. Corniea, first rejected the live birth requirement in favor of the viability rule.
65
[*259] The court held that a cause of action would lie when a stillbirth results from prenatal injuries to a viable unborn child. 66
In refuting the common law belief that the child in utero is merely an extension of the woman's anatomy, Verkennes cited several
cases including Bonbrest v Kotz 67 and Judge Boggs's dissent in Allaire. 6S Verkennes led the way for other jurisdictions to expand
liability for the wrongful death of a viable child within the womb.
3. Previability
Currently, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, South Dakota, and West Virginia have extended wrongful death liability to those
injuries causing the death of a previable child. Of these six, "five permit the cause of action at any point during gestation. Georgia
alone uses 'quickening' as the point when a wrongful death action is recognized." 69
In Georgia, Tucker v. Carmichae! & Sons first broached the issue of whether an infant could recover damages for prenatal injuries.
The state's highest court held in the affirmative for the child, emphasizing that life begins "when the child is able to stir in the
mother's womb." 70 Four years later, a Georgia appellate court, in Porter v. Lassiter, ruled that an action may be maintained for the
death of an unborn child who was "quick" or "able to move in the mother's womb" at the time of death. 71 In this case, the mother
was approximately six weeks pregnant at the time of the accident and was four and a half months pregnant when a miscarriage
occurred 72 The court determined that the Georgia Code, which allows suit for the wrongful death of a "child," included that of a
"quickened" fetus because it also declares that "the wilful killing of an unborn child so far developed as to be ordinarily called 'quick',

sic is considered as murder." 73 Therefore, "as a result of the Porter decision, Georgia became the first state to allow wrongful death
recovery for the death of an unborn fetus that may not be viable at the time of the tortious act." 7A
In 1981, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Danos v. St. Pierre initially denied recovery for a six-month-old fetus that suffered prenatal
[*260] injury and was subsequently stillborn. 7S However, upon rehearing, the court reversed and allowed the parents of the
deceased child to recover for the wrongful death. 76 To support its ruling, the court reasoned, "The loss to parents of a child who
otherwise would have been born normally is substantially the same, whether the tortfeasor's fault causes the child to be born dead or
to die shortly after being born alive . . . ." 7 7 Also, recent Louisiana legislation had pronounced "that a human being exists from the
moment of fertilization and implantation."78 Danos also rejected the argument that an unborn child is a part of the mother's anatomy,
stating;
We believe the infant is a child from the moment of its conception although life may be in a state of suspended animation the subject
of love, affection, and hope and that the injury or killing of it, in its mother's womb . . . gives the bereaved parents a right of action
against the guilty parties for their grief, and mental anguish. 79

Missouri courts held to the position that a viable fetus is not a "person" within Missouri's wrongful death statute until the 1983 case of
O'Grady v. Brown. 80 In Rambo v. Lawson, the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to extend liability to a previable fetus that died in
utero as a result of an automobile accident.81 However, the court reversed itself in 1995 and allowed recovery for the wrongful death
of a previable child at four months gestation.82 In examining the statutory intent behind state abortion regulation, which in part says
that "the life of each human being begins at conception" and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing," the court found that the general assembly had directed "that the time of conception and not viability is the determinative
point at which the legally protected rights, privileges, and immunities should be deemed to arise." 83
In 1984, South Dakota specifically amended its statute to include the wrongful death of an unborn child. M In 1986, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota held that even under the pre-amendment statute, because of the "'clear, overwhelming and growing majority
of jurisdictions' permitting actions in such cases, a cause of action for the death of a [*261] viable, unborn fetus did exist under the
former wrongful death statute." 85
The court further held in Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms that South Dakota's amended wrongful death statute provides a cause of
action for the Joss of the previable unborn child. 86 In this case, parents had brought a wrongful death action against a frozen food
company claiming that the company's salmonella-contaminated chicken had caused the mother to miscarry. At the time of the
miscarriage, the unborn child was clearly previable at only seven weeks gestation. 87 The court focused its analysis on the
construction of the statute, and found that by amending the statute to include an "unborn child" and not a "fetus or embryo," the
legislature meant to "include any child still within a mother's womb." 88 Furthermore, the intent of the legislature is seen where an
"unborn child" in criminal statutes is defined as "'an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.'"
89
The court also noted that apart from balancing "the privacy rights of the mother against her unborn child," the term "viability is
purely an arbitrary milestone from which to reckon a child's legal existence," since this is a relative matter that may vary depending
on the mother's health and other factors apart from the state of development. 90
In West Virginia, the landmark case of Farley v. Sartin declared that a previable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of West
Virginia's wrongful death statute. 91 In Farley, the plaintiff's pregnant wife was killed in an auto accident along with their child who
had developed to approximately eighteen weeks gestation. The court held that
justice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to walk away with impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child has
not yet reached viability at the time of death. . . . Our concern reflects the fundamental value determination of our society that life —
old, young, and prospective — should not be wrongfully taken away. 92

[*262]
IV. Illinois' Struggle to Define Human Life
A. Illinois Wrongful Death Act 93
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act, "enacted by the General Assembly in 1853, created for the first time in Illinois a cause of action for
death." 94 The Act patterns the 1847 New York statute, which substantially copied Lord Campbell's Act. 95
In 1973, Justice Ryan in his dissent to Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg asked: "'Why set the line of demarcation at viability? Why
should not a cause of action exist for the death of a fetus in its previable state?'" 96 In 1980, the Illinois Legislature enacted section
2.2 of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act which states:
The state of gestation or development of a human being when an injury is caused, when an injury takes effect, or at death, shall not
foreclose maintenance of any cause of action under the law of this State arising from the death of a human being caused by wrongful
act, neglect or default. 97

Senator Rhoads introduced this bill by explaining that while at the time case law permitted "'the representative of the unborn child at
viability to bring a cause of action for wrongful death[,]'" there was no case law clarifying the gap between conception and viability, a
gap that section 2.2 would now fill. 98
B. Illinois Case History
1. Case History Prior to Miller v. American Infertility Group
In 1973, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg first addressed whether under the Illinois Wrongful Death
Act parents could recover for the wrongful death of a child who dies in [ * 2 6 3 ] the womb. 99 During her thirty-sixth week of
pregnancy, an automobile negligently struck Mrs. Chrisafogeorgis, later causing her baby boy to be stillborn. The Court had previously

held in Amman v. Faidy 10° that "there is a right of action for injuries wrongfully sustained by a viable child . . when the child
survives the injuries and is born alive." 101 In Chnsafogeorgis, the court chose to extend this liability to a viable fetus that dies in
utero. 102 The court cited cases from other jurisdictions which described the bizarre results of only allowing recovery for a child who is
born alive. "For example, a doctor or a midwife whose negligent acts in delivering a baby produced the baby's death would be legally
immune from a lawsuit However if they badly injured the child they would be exposed to liability." 103 Justice Ryan further argued in
his dissent that the distinction between viability and nonviability is relative and thus causes similarly incongruous results as the
distinction made between a child who dies shortly before birth and one who dies shortly thereafter. 104
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, the court held that an infant could maintain an action against the hospital for injuries sustained
from a negligent blood transfusion given to the mother prior to the child's conception 105 The court noted that viability is a relative
matter and that "denial of claims for injuries to the previable fetus may indeed cut off some of the most meritorious claims, for there
is substantial medical authority that congenital structural defects caused by factors in the prenatai environment can be sustained only
early in the previable stages " 106 While Renslow did not address wrongful death, it did cast doubt on upholding viability as the
standard for recovery.
One year after Renslow, the court in Green v Smith addressed whether a father could recover for the wrongful death of a child who
died in utero at fourteen weeks gestation. 107 The court held that unless the fetus was viable, there would be no recovery, and that
viability was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 108 The court distinguished this from Renslow by stating:
In our opinion there is a clear distinction between a common law cause of action on behalf of a live-born infant for injuries suffered
prior to its
[*264J
having become viable, and a statutory cause of action for the destruction of a fetus not yet viable The extent of the loss incurred by a
living child burdened with mental or physical defects resulting from a prenatal occurrence is not affected by whether the injuries were
suffered prior to or after he became viable. On the other hand, the Wrongful Death Act provides for recovery for the "death of a
person," and we find no basis upon which to hold that one can cause the death of a fetus not yet viable 109

However, in 1980, the Illinois legislature amended the Wrongful Death Act to clarify that age of gestation will not bar recovery for the
wrongful death of a developing child 110 Seef v Sutkus is the primary case addressing the wrongful death of a fetus following the
amended legislation. X11 In Seef, a child was stillborn at thirty-eight weeks after a physician and hospital negligently failed to monitor
the child and to perform a timely c-section 112 The parents sought pecuniary damages for loss of the child's society. 113 The court
explained that because section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act prohibits limitation of a wrongful death claim based on the state of
gestation or development, "an unborn fetus is recognized as a 'person' and parents may recover damages for 'pecuniary injuries'
resulting from the death of the unborn fetus." 114 The concurring opinion clarifies that the 1980 legislation eliminates the viability
requirement of Chnsafogeorgis; however, the amount of pecuniary damages that the parents may recover is a separate issue. l l s
Illinois has led the way in enacting legislation that provides recovery for the wrongful death of a previable fetus. Recently, Miller v
American Infertility Group raised the important issue of whether the right of recovery given under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act to
any "'state of gestation or development of a human being'" includes not only an embryo developing in the womb, but also an embryo
artificially created and preserved in vitro, outside the womb. 116
2. Miller v American Infertility Group
Allison Miller and her husband, Todd Parish, sought treatment for [*265] infertility from the Center for Human Reproduction in
Illinois (Center) 117 In the typical preparation for in vitro fertilization, 118 the Center harvested Allison's eggs and then fertilized them
with Todd's sperm As a result, nine viable embryos were created and then frozen so that they could later be implanted in Allison's
uterus The couple believed "that at least one of these embryos developed into a healthy blastocyst", however, it was wrongfully
destroyed by the Center on or around January 13, 2000. 119 Allison and Todd first learned of their loss in June 2000 when they wished
to transfer the embryo to another facility. The Center notified them by letter stating: "Based on our records, one of our junior
embryologists informed you that we would freeze one embryo at the blastocyst stage . . . A [senior embryologist] then decided not
to cryopreserve this embryo." 120
Miller and Parish filed suit against the Center and their complaint consisted of three counts including claims for negligence, willful and
wanton misconduct, breach of contract, and wrongful death On May 4, 2004, Judge David Lichtenstein dismissed with prejudice the
claims based on negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, and breach of contract "with leave to replead, provided that the
references to the Wrongful Death Act were removed " 12t Upon dismissal, Miller and Parish moved to reconsider The court (with a
new judge, as the previous trial judge had retired) denied the motion, refusing to reconsider the original order. The plaintiffs again
moved for reconsideration, and Judge Jeffery Lawrence chose to review Lichtenstein's dismissal order and the order denying
reconsiderations. 122
A trial judge has the authority to revisit interlocutory orders — those orders that do not dispose of "all the counts or issues in the
case." 123 Lawrence chose to review these orders since the case "involves an issue of public importance which is apparently one of first
impression in Illinois." 124
Not only is this an issue of first impression for Illinois, but one for almost all jurisdictions, with the exception being Rhode Island In
Frisma v Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, the Superior Court of Rhode Island held that three couples could not maintain an
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress against a fertility [*266] clinic following the loss and destruction of several frozen
embryos. 125 In analyzing whether the destroyed preembryos were victims, the court cited various cases from other jurisdictions
where frozen embryos were "'not recognized as 'persons' for constitutional purposes."' i26 Also, the court deferred to Miccolis v. Arnica
Mutua' Insurance Co., 127 in which it had held "that a previable fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of the wrongful death
statute." 128 The Prisma court held that this "would also preclude pre-embryos from being considered victims." x29 Because Rhode
Island holds to the viability approach for the wrongful death of the unborn, Fnsma's failure to extend legal rights to the frozen embryo
is not surprising
In Miller, Judge Lawrence presented two key issues. "(1) is a pre-embryo a 'human being' within the meaning of Sec. 2.2 of the

Wrongful Death Act, and (2) must it be implanted in its mother's uterus to give rise to a claim under the Act for its destruction?"
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In analyzing whether section 2.2 of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act includes legal standing for the preembryo, as it does for the
previable embryo, Miller emphasizes that the "words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning." i 3 1 In 1980, section
2.2 was added to the Wrongful Death Act. It states: "The state of gestation or development of a human being when an injury is
caused . . . shall not foreclose maintenance of any cause of action . . . arising from the death of a human being caused by wrongful
a c t . . . ." 132 This amendment was sponsored by Senator Rhoads, who believed the bill would "'close a gap in the current law, both
case and statutory law, covering that period . . . from the time of conception to the time of viability."' 133
However, neither Rhoads nor any of the other legislators attempted to define "human being." When necessary, the court may use
"legislative history and the language of other statutes concerning related subject matter" to discern statutory construction. 134 While
the Wrongful Death Act fails to define "human being," the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 does [*267] define the term. 135 According
to Miller, the Abortion Law makes it clear that while "philosophers and theologians may debate . . . there is no doubt in the mind of
the Illinois Legislature when life begins. It begins at conception." 136 Section 1 of the Abortion Law declares:
The General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and find in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that
the unborn child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the unborn child's
right to life and is entitled to the right to life from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State. 137

Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law states that:
(5) "Fertilization" and "conception" each mean the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm, which shall be deemed to have
occurred at the time when it is known a spermatozoon has penetrated the cell membrane of the ovum.

(6) "Fetus" and "unborn child" each mean an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.
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Because of the legislative intent behind section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act, as well as the Abortion Law's clear definition of "human
being" including the unborn child "from the time of conception," the Miller order concludes that under Illinois statutory law an embryo
not yet implanted in the womb is just as much a human being as an embryo developing in utero. 139
The second issue addressed by Miller is whether a preembryo must be implanted in its mother's uterus to give rise to a claim under
the Wrongful Death Act. Judge Lawrence again turns to the construction of the amendment. Although Rhoads's discussion of the bill
focuses on the term "gestation," the final version of amendment section 2.2 reads "gestation or development of a human being." 14°
Because section 2.2 also includes the term development, and not merely the term gestation, "it is a reasonable inference that [the
legislature] must have contemplated nongestational development or development outside the womb." 141 In conclusion, Miller finds
that it would be illogical to "allow a claim for the death of a human being after implantation in its mother's womb but deny it for one
before implantation." 142 [*268]
V. Proposal
A. Why All States Should Permit Recovery for the Wrongful Death of Both Previable Embryos and Preembryos
1. Natural Law Tradition of Valuing Life
If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished .
. . and he shall pay as the judges determine. And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life . . . . i 4 3

Many jurisdictions, struggling with the determination of when life truly begins, have cited Blackstone to support a position of valuing
early human life. For example, Justice Boggs, in his dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, cited Blackstone in support of the then
innovative concept of legal viability. 144 Blackstone, reflecting the principle of justice for the unborn in Exodus 21:22, states:

The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and
his reputation.

1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an
infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or
if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the
ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But [the modern law] doth not look upon this offense in quite so atrocious a light, but merely
as a heinous misdemeanor.

An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a
legacy . . . . It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by
such limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point the civil law agrees with ours. 145

Verkennes v. Corniea, the first case to reject the live birth requirement and adopt the viability standard, cited Blackstone in support of
its expansion of legal rights for the unborn. 146 Both Boggs's dissent in Allaire and the majority in Verkennes found inconsistency
between the current property and criminal law which treated the unborn as human "from the moment of conception," and the law of
negligence [ * 2 6 9 ] which continued to treat the child as part of the mother. 147 Blackstone first emphasized this contradiction and
declared that life begins "as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." 148
In the Illinois Supreme Court case of Amman v. Faidy, the court similarly cited Blackstone in support of its decision to allow an infant
to maintain an action for prenatal injuries when it stated, "It would therefore seem to us to be an unwarranted reflection upon the
common law itself to attribute to it a greater concern for the protection of property than for the protection of the person." 149
The natural law, as reflected by Blackstone, gives foundational support for valuing human life and not treating the death of the
unborn as a mere misdemeanor, but rather as an offense equal to that of the wrongful death of any other human being.
2. Scientific Evidence that the Previable Embryo is Human Life
In Davis v. Davis, a mother sought custody of seven cryogenically frozen embryos following a divorce. 15 ° Her ex-husband desired
custody in order to have the embryos destroyed. At the trial in Maryville, Tennessee, world renowned French geneticist Jerome
Lejeune, M.D., Ph.D., testified to the humanity of the frozen embryos. 151 Lejeune passionately articulated t h a t life begins at
conception:
Each of us has a unique beginning, the moment of conception . . . . As soon as the twenty-three chromosomes carried by the sperm
encounter the twenty-three chromosomes carried by the ovum, the whole information necessary and sufficient to spell out all the
characteristics of the new being is gathered." 1S2
Lejeune went on to speak of the unnecessary and potentially misleading terminology of labeling a frozen embryo a preembryo since
before an embryo there is a sperm and an egg, and that's it. And the sperm and the egg cannot be a pre-embryo because you cannot
tell what embryo it will be, because you don't know what sperm will go into what egg, but once it is made, you have got a zygote and
when it divides it's an embryo and that's it.
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I think it's important because people would believe that a pre-embryo does not have the same significance as an embryo. And in fact,
on the contrary, a first cell knows more and is more specialized . . . than any cell which is later in our organism. 153

Lejeune's testimony is filled with detailed explanation of scientific advancements concerning the genetic code and the beginning of
life. He describes the process of freezing embryos as placing them in a "concentration can." 1 5 4 This "can" does not stop life, to be
later started anew after thawing. Rather, the low temperatures greatly slow down cells' microscopic movements and arrest "the flux
of t i m e " for the embryo, which if thawed "will again begin to flourish and to divide." 155 Lejeune clarifies t h a t

an early human being in this suspended time inside the can, cannot be the property of anybody because he is the only one in the
world to have the property of building himself. And I would say that science has a very simple conception of m a n ; as soon as he has
been conceived, a man is a man. 156

The trial court heard from a total of seven experts in the fields of genetics, embryology, and in vitro fertilization, four of which agreed
"that the seven cryopreserved embryos are human; that is, 'belonging or relating to man.'" 157 Based on their determination that the
embryos were human beings, the trial court awarded the mother custody so t h a t she would have the opportunity to bring the children
to t e r m through implantation. However, the court of appeals reversed, holding that "'the parties share an interest in the seven
fertilized ova"' and remanded the case to the trial court to give them "'joint control . . . and equal voice over their disposition."' 158
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the husband's interests outweighed the wife's, and thus the husband was entitled to
custody of the embryos and had the ability to determine whether the embryos should be destroyed. The final outcome of Davis
resulted in Tennessee adopting the standard that "preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life." 159
Although Tennessee chose to treat frozen embryos as quasi-property, the testimony of Jerome Lejeune, as well as his research and
t h a t of others within the scientific community, gives strong evidence for [ * 2 7 1 ] supporting the standard t h a t human life begins
from the moment the sperm fertilizes the ovum.
The law has long given deference to scientific advancement in the shaping of legal rights given to the unborn. For example, in 1900
Justice Boggs argued that
medical science and skill . . . have demonstrated that at a period of gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus is
capable of independent and separate life, and that, though within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of her body, for her
body may die in all of its parts and the child remain alive, and capable of maintaining life, when separated f r o m the dead body of the
mother. . . . Is it not sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the
mother? 160

In Bonbrest v. Kotz, the landmark case which rejected the notion that an unborn child is merely an extension of the mother, the court
used current science to correct an error in the law. 161 The court held that because "modern medicine is replete with cases of living
children being taken from dead mothers," a fetus can no longer be treated as legally one with the mother. 162
Like Bonbrest and other cases which have used the understanding of modern medicine and human development to correct a
scientifically outdated law, states should specifically amend their wrongful death statutes to reflect the current scientific evidence that
life begins at conception. Not only must the law give rights to embryos in utero, but also to those embryos which are fully human but
not yet implanted within the womb. "Once conceived, a man is a man." 163
3. Inconsistency in Distinguishing In Vivo and In Vitro Previable Embryos
Those jurisdictions which reject the viability standard in favor of allowing wrongful death recovery for a previable embryo have justly
done so in part due to the relativity and inconsistency of the viability standard. Likewise, Justice Ryan's concurrence in Green v. Smith
argues for abandoning the viability standard in favor of a more definite standard. 164 Ryan argues that
viability is . . . dependent upon the weight and race of the child and the techniques which are presently available to sustain the life of
the fetus outside the womb. . . . For this court to base its determination
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that an unborn child becomes a 'person' only at the point of viability is to premise the right to maintain an action for wrongful death
on an uncertain and continually changing standard. 16S

However, it is similarly inconsistent for those jurisdictions that have extended legal rights to the previable embryo in the womb to
deny the same rights to the frozen previable embryo. The only difference between those embryos is that an in vivo embryo has
implanted within the lining of the uterus. 166 Implantation, however, is not a definite standard for determining human legal status,
since it can occur anywhere from six to twelve days after fertilization of the ovum. 167
The best standard supported by scientific evidence is that of conception. From a legal standpoint, the actual date of conception may
be less significant for naturally conceived children; however, it is crucial for those children conceived through in vitro fertilization,
since in those cases one can pinpoint the precise timing of conception. The moment that the sperm fertilizes the egg — whether inside
or outside of a woman's body — human life begins. Wrongful death law, as in Miller v. American Infertility Group, should reflect this
definite standard.
B. Model Legislation
Below is suggested legislation which states may use as a model to amend their Wrongful Death Acts to reflect modern scientific
understanding of human development and give equal legal rights to in vivo and in vitro human life.
The state of gestation of a human being or the location of a developing human being when an injury is caused, when an injury takes
effect, or at death, shall not bar any cause of action under the law of this State arising from the death of a human being caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default.

A "human being" is an individual organism of the species homo sapiens beginning with the moment of conception, meaning the
fertilization of a human ovum with a human sperm. Any form of preservation of a fertilized human ovum does not change its status as
a human being. 16S
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VI. Conclusion
All jurisdictions have struggled to define when human life reaches the stage of development that will warrant recovery for wrongful
death. The answer to this struggle is modeled both by Illinois' statutory and case law. The legislation protects the previable embryo,
as does Miller v. American Infertility Group, which affirms that human life exists from conception until death. According to Miller, even
previable frozen embryos should be recognized under wrongful death law as persons with legal status equal to that of a living child.
Other previability jurisdictions should make the logical step to include rights not only for previable embryos in the womb, but also for
those created and preserved through in vitro procedures. Those jurisdictions which still hold to the scientifically outdated standard of
"live birth," as well as those which hold to the inconsistent standard of "viability" for wrongful death recovery, should follow Illinois'
lead and amend their legislation to adopt "conception" as the definitive standard for embryonic legal rights.
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Primer on Legal Recognition & Protection
of Unborn & Newly Born
By Denise M. Burke
Vice President of Legal Affairs, Americans United for Life

T

he unimaginable grief and suffering endured by Laci and Conner Peterson's
family has, largely due to their own courageous advocacy, been transformed into a blow
for justice on behalf of unborn victims of criminal violence. In April 2004, President Bush
signed the "Unborn Victims of Violence Act",
more commonly known as "Laci and Conner's
Law," filling an important gap in federal law.
Federal prosecutors may now charge an assailant in the death of an unborn child when the
death occurs on federal property, such as military installations, or when the death stems from
the commission of a federal crime.

Thanks in large part to research and advocacy
by Clarke D. Forsythe of Americans United for
Life (AUL), this picture has changed, including the enactment of the California law which
permitted prosecutors to file charges for the
deaths of both Laci and Conner Petersen.
Unborn victims of violence laws are just one
example of how states may provide legal recognition of and protection for the unborn outside the context of abortion. There are several
more available under both criminal and civil
statutes.
Issues

More importantly, Laci and Conner lived in
a state (California) where prosecutors could
press murder charges for the deaths of both this
young mother and her unborn son. Thirty-six
states carry such provisions in their criminal
law, often referred to as fetal homicide laws.
As for the remaining 14 states, Laci Peterson's mother, Sharon Rocha, has said it best,
that they are in effect telling grieving families
that "innocent victims [like Cornier] are not really victims—indeed that they never existed at
all."
Twenty years ago, the picture was even more
bleak. The vast majority of states followed the
outdated born-alive rule, requiring an unborn
victim to be born after the assault, and then to
die, before prosecutors could press charges.

Fetal Homicide
In recent years, several high-profile cases from
across the nation have highlighted the need for
laws protecting unborn victims from criminal
violence. Perhaps most notably, the tragic
deaths of Laci and Conner Peterson have focused much-needed attention on this critically
important issue. Currently, 36 states provide
some degree of protection for unborn victims
of homicide.
Under common law,1 the killing of an unborn
child was not considered a homicide unless
the child was first born alive and then died as
a result of a criminal prenatal act. This rule,
called "the bom-alive rule," is still followed in
a majority of states that have not enacted spe-
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cial legislation to protect unborn children from hol, but to provide, encourage, and, in some
criminal violence. Thus, if someone shoots a cases, mandate reporting and treatment. Simipregnant woman, killing her child, he or she larly, 20 states fund special drug and alcohol
is not subject to criminal prosecution for the treatment programs for pregnant women and
murder of the child unless the child is first bora newborns.
alive and then dies as a result of the injuries
which the child sustained before birth. The Civil Causes of Action for the Wrongful Death
purpose of the laws protecting unborn victims of an Unborn Child
of homicide, also know as fetal homicide laws, Moreover, by court decision or statute, 38 states
is to overturn the common law born-alive rule allow a wrongful death (civil) cause of action
and criminalize conduct causing the death of for the death of an unborn child.3 Of these, 29
an unborn child. These laws are not directed states allow a wrongful death suit if the child is
at abortion which, under current constitutional viable; nine states allow suits for a pre-viable
unborn child; and 12 states still require a live
doctrine, is protected.
birth, barring a cause of action for the death of
the unborn child unless the child is born alive
Nonfatal Assaults on the Unborn
On occasion, the assailant's attack does not and dies thereafter.
result in the death of the unborn child, but instead injures the child in utero (perhaps also Refusal to Recognize Wrongful Life
resulting in a premature delivery). In such in- or Wrongful Birth Lawsuits
stances, 21 states permit the prosecution of the A number of states also refuse to recognize
assailant for assault.
wrongful life or wrongful birth causes of action. "Wrongful life" is an "action...brought
by or on behalf of the child...[who] alleges,
One-Victim Laws
A minority of jurisdictions—11 states—have because of the defendant's negligence, his parenacted one-victim laws that permit prosecu- ents either decided to conceive him ignorant
tions and enhanced penalties in cases where a of the risk of an impairment or birth defect or
woman is assaulted and suffers a miscarriage, were deprived of information during gestation
stillbirth, or "damage to [her] pregnancy." No- that would have prompted them to terminate
tably, of these states, six do not have another the pregnancy."4 Simply put, in a wrongful life
law (such as a fetal homicide law) that recog- action, a child is arguing that (1) the pregnancy
nizes the unborn child as a second victim of should have been terminated; (2) that "but for
the attack.2
the defendant's negligence" the plaintiff would
not have been born; and (3) the plaintiff's life
Prevention and Treatment of Maternal Drug would have been better not lived.5
and Alcohol Abuse
In recent years, a number of states have passed Meanwhile, "wrongful birth" is an "action
laws providing protection for women and their brought by the parent of a child born with an
children from the ravages of drug and alcohol impairment or birth defect." The basic arguabuse. The intent of these laws is not to crimi- ment made by the parent is that he/she would
nalize the mother's use of drugs and/or alco- have aborted the child if he/she had known that
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the child would be disabled.6 Since the birth
defect is naturally occurring, "[tjhe parent alleges that the negligence of those charged with
prenatal testing or genetic counseling deprived
them of the right to make a timely decision
regarding whether to terminate a pregnancy
because of the likelihood their child would be
born physically or mentally impaired."7
Wrongful life and wrongful birth claims raise
significant issues because their core arguments
attack the sanctity of life of every human person—these claims assert that some lives are
better off not lived, that the disabled are better off dead.8 To term children with disabilities
"defective'* and advocate for their elimination
prior to birth is to dangerously re-classify the
disabled as less human, to grant these citizens
fewer rights, and to attribute a lower value to
their lives and contributions to humanity. "9
Currently, 29 states have either refused to recognize or limited a wrongful life action, while
three states expressly permit this controversial
cause of action.
Unfortunately, wrongful birth causes of action
have found significantly greater acceptance by
state courts, legislatures, and the public. Thirty-two states permit wrongful birth causes of
action, while only 11 states expressly prohibit
such causes of action.
Myths & Facts
Myth: Laws extending legal recognition and
protection to unborn children are unconstitutional because they give legal status to an unborn child and/or contradict the established
tenets of Roe v. Wade.
Fact: Despite numerous challenges, no law

protecting unborn children outside the context
of abortion have been struck down as unconstitutional. Moreover, these laws do not directly
implicate the right to choose an abortion. For
example, unborn victims of violence laws, also
known as fetal homicide laws, specifically exclude the performance of a legal abortion from
potential criminal liability. They also do not
apply to conduct to which the mother of the
unborn child (or her legal guardian) consents,
such as medical treatment or an abortion.
Myth: Crimes that result in the death of or
injury to an unborn child are merely offenses
against the pregnant woman, with death or
harm to the unborn child being an incidental or
accidental consequence.
Fact: The failed effort by Senator Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA) to gut "Laci and Conner's
Law" (by making assault on a pregnant woman
an ''enhanced offense" if her unborn child also
dies) sought to perpetuate this view. Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth. In
many cases involving violence against pregnant women, the assailant attacks a pregnant
woman with the intent of killing the unborn
child by causing a miscarriage or stillbirth. In
some, the woman refused to have an abortion
and the child's father, rather than respecting her
choice, reacts violently to end the pregnancy.
In these situations, women have been savagely
beaten, pushed down flights of stairs, and suffered blows, stab wounds, and gunshots targeted to the abdomen. Sometimes, this violence
takes a less savage, but no less deadly turn. In
2002, an Ohio physician whose pregnant girlfriend had refused to have an abortion spiked
her drink with a prescription drug known to
cause miscarriage.
Myth: Now that we have the federal "Unborn
Defending Life 2009
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Victims of Violence Act," there is no need to
pass similar state protections.
Fact: Murder and assaults, except in limited
circumstances, are typically state crimes. The
vast majority of the criminal prosecutions for
homicide and assault take place in state courts,
not in federal courts, so it is critical that each
state protect the unborn from criminal violence. Conversely, "Laci and Conner's Law"
only applies to federal crimes and federal jurisdictions, such as military installations.
Thus, the biggest impact of "Laci and Conner's
Law" may be in its revisions to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Military
prosecutors can now pursue charges against
military personnel stationed anywhere in the
world if their actions cause the death of an unborn child; previously, they were limited to filing such charges only in those states with laws
protecting unborn victims of violence. A case
such as that of Airman Gregory L. Roberts,
who in 1996 savagely beat his pregnant wife,
rupturing her uterus and killing their unborn
daughter, resulted in manslaughter charges
only because Ohio, where he was stationed, had
such a law on its books. Had Roberts been stationed in Colorado or North Carolina—states
with a significant military presence, but no law
protecting an unborn child from violence—he
could not have been charged with his daughter's death and would have faced prosecution
only for the assault on his wife.

For more information about unborn victims of violence laws, see
the "Quick Reference Table'' in the Appendix.
Endnote
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As distinguished from laws created by the enactments of legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those principles
and rules of action, relating the government and security of persons and property, that derive their authority solely from usages
and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and
i>

Americans United for Life

£\

decrees of courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs. The most common source of American common law is English common law.
2
These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa. Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
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as "homicide."
3
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Rev. 41 (2004). See also Amber Dina, Wrongful Death and the
Legal Status of the Previable Embryo, 19 Regent U. L. Rev.
251 (2006/2007). (Nebraska and Texas have changed their law
by statute since 2004).
4
See e.g., Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. Dist. Ct. 1980).
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Id.
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"See Gleitmanv. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689; Willis, 362 S.E.2d 63;
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); and Pwcanik v. Cillo, 478
A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
9
Darpana M. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 641, n.23 (2006) (arguing that
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims violate the "Americans
with Disabilities Act").

